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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
•XT 
V. 
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.20020220-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002) where the defendant in a criminal case may take an appeal to this 
Court from a final order for anything except a conviction/charge involving a first degree 
or capital felony offense. In the underlying case(s) related to this appeal, Appellant 
Charles Diviney entered a guilty plea for the felony offenses of burglary and aggravated 
assault, and for the misdemeanor offenses of simple assault (two counts) and violating a 
protective order. The trial court entered judgments in the matter for the offenses as 
pleaded with the exception of burglary; there the court entered a "Judgment, Sentence" 
for aggravated burglary. A copy of each judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
A. Whether the "Judgment, Sentence" in this case for aggravated burglary is 
incorrect as a matter of law where Diviney entered a guilty plea for burglary. 
Standard of Review: Diviney has raised the first issue on appeal under the plain-
error doctrine. Under that doctrine, this Court will consider whether an error exists and 
whether the error is obvious and prejudicial. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^[30, 
992 P.2d 951 (court will consider plain error on appeal); see also State v. Labrum, 925 
P.2d 937, 940-41 (Utah 1996). Also, this Court may consider an issue of clerical error 
for the first time on appeal. See State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Utah 1988). 
B. Whether the order of restitution in this case was improper in part under the law. 
Standard of Review: This Court will consider whether the trial court's restitution 
order exceeded the authority prescribed by law. The standard is as follows: 
"[Wjhether or not restitution is proper in this case depends solely upon 
interpretation of the governing statute, and the 'trial court's interpretation of a 
statute presents a question of law.'" State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)). "'We 
accord a lower court's statutory interpretations no particular deference but assess 
them for correctness, as we do any other conclusion of law.1" Id. (quoting Salt 
Lake City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted)). 
State v.McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App.), ceil denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1997). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The first issue was not preserved in the record. Diviney has raised the issue as 
plain error and clerical error. See Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ |30 (recognizing that appellate 
court will consider plain error); Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940-41; Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389-
90. Diviney also has raised the issue under Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure. The second issue was preserved at 408:12-13; 292-93; and 410. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and rules will be determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 (Supp. 2001); 76-6-202 (1999); and 76-6-203 (1999); and 
Utah Rules Criminal Procedure 22(e) and 30(b) (2003). The text of those provisions is 
contained in the attached Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below. 
On July 5, 2000, the state charged Diviney in Case No. 001911430 (hereinafter 
"Case 1430")) with witness tampering, a third degree felony; and three misdemeanor 
charges, including two counts of assault, and one count of violating a protective order. 
(Case 1430 at 2-4.) 
The state also charged Diviney in Case No. 001912025 (hereinafter "Case 2025") 
with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; three counts of aggravated assault, third 
degree felonies; tampering with a witness, a third degree felony; and violating a 
protective order, a class A misdemeanor. (Case 2025 at 19-22.) 
On December 11, 2000, Diviney entered guilty pleas for charges in Case Nos. 
2025 and 1430. Diviney pleaded guilty to two felony offenses (burglary and aggravated 
assault) and three misdemeanor offenses (two counts of assault and one count of 
violating a protective order). (See Case 2025 at 105-112; R. 291:3-12.) 
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In connection with the guilty pleas, the prosecutor filed a Second Amended 
Domestic Violence Information ("Second Amended Information") reflecting the charges 
to which Diviney pleaded from both Case Nos. 2025 and 1430. (R. 291:3-6; Case 2025 
at 113-115.) The state filed the Second Amended Information in Case No. 2025.l 
On April 30, 2001, the trial court sentenced Diviney for aggravated burglary, 
aggravated assault, simple assault (2 counts) and violating a protective order. (Case 2025 
at 122-131.) In connection with the sentences, the judge ordered Diviney to serve a jail 
sentence, and to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by Adult Probation and 
Parole ("AP&P"). (Id.) The judge also ruled that if Diviney disputed the restitution 
amount, he would be entitled to a hearing on the matter. (Case 2025 at 127.) 
Thereafter, in August 2001, AP&P requested a restitution hearing. (Case 2025 at 
152.) Diviney also requested a hearing and discovery of information relating to 
restitution. (Case 2025 at 153-156.) On November 5, 2001, the trial court commenced a 
hearing. (Case 2025 at 167-68.) The court continued the hearing to December 17, 2001, 
and to February 4, 2002 (see Case 2025 at 182-83, 188-89). On February 28, 2002, the 
court ordered Diviney to pay restitution in the amount of $4,098.42 plus interest from 
the date of sentencing. (Case 2025 at 191-92.) 
1 After the prosecutor filed a Second Amended Information, which reflects the charges 
from both Case Nos. 2025 and 1430, the trial court proceeded with the matter only in 
Case No. 2025. (SeeR. 291:10; see also Case 1430 at 29, 31-33.) 
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On March 11, 2002, the defense filed a notice of appeal (Case 2025 at 194-95 ). 
On April 15, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court entered an order dismissing the appeal for 
failure to file the docketing statement in a timely manner. The order specified that the 
court would reinstate the appeal if defendant submitted the docketing statement within 
ten days from the date of the order. (Case 2025 at 201.) The court dated the order of 
dismissal April 15, 2002 (Case 2025 at 201), and served it on the parties on April 30, 
2002. (Case 2025 at 200,202.) On May 2, 2002, the defendant filed a docketing 
statement in the case. This appeal followed.2 (See Case 2025 at 242.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 2000, the state charged Diviney with various crimes against his 
estranged wife Deborah and his son Charles Diviney, III (Chuck). (Case 2025 at 2-4; 
Case 1430 at 2-4.) On December 11, 2000, the state prepared a Second Amended 
Information against Diviney. The Second Amended Information charged Diviney with 
burglary, aggravated assault, two counts of simple assault and violating a protective 
order. (Case 2025 at 113-15.) 
Diviney entered a guilty plea in connection with each count set forth in the Second 
Amended Information. With respect to the burglary count, Diviney pleaded guilty to 
2 In later proceedings, the trial court issued separate warrants for Diviney!s arrest for 
alleged probation violations. (See e.g. Case 2025 at 206-07 and 325-36.) In connection 
with the alleged violations, the court also entered orders to show cause why probation 
should not be revoked. (See e.g. Case 2025 at 229-30 and 323-24.) Those matters are 
not before this Court on appeal. 
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entering/remaining unlawfully at Chuck Diviney's residence (6662 South Royal Harvest 
Way) on July 11, 2000, with intent to commit an assault. (Case 2025 at 106; R. 291:10.) 
For the aggravated assault count, Diviney pleaded guilty to assaulting Chuck 
Diviney on July 11, 2000, at 6662 South Royal Harvest Way, with "a dangerous weapon 
- tire changing implement." (Case 2025 at 106; R. 291:11.) 
With respect to the two counts for assault, Diviney pleaded guilty to assaulting 
Deborah Diviney "by committing an act with unlawful force or violence that caused [] 
bodily injury to Deborah Diviney, [while] acting recklessly, knowingly or intentionally." 
(Case 2025 at 106; 291:8-9.) The first assault occurred on June 14, 2000, at 2075 East 
Harvest Park Court (R. 291:8-9), and the second occurred on July 11, 2000, at 6662 
South Royal Harvest Way. (R. 291:10-11.) 
For violating a protective order, Diviney pleaded guilty to the following: On or 
about June 14, 2000, at 2075 East Harvest Park Court, he "was subjected] to a 
protective order and did intentionally or knowingly violate it after having been served 
with it." (Case 2025 at 106; R. 291:9.) 
After Diviney pleaded guilty to the charges, the trial court conducted sentencing 
proceedings. The court sentenced Diviney to two years in jail followed by probation (R. 
408:11-12), and deferred the issue of restitution to AP&P. (R. 408:7.) Thereafter, both 
AP&P and Diviney requested a restitution hearing. Diviney also requested discovery of 
information relating to amounts claimed in restitution. (Case 2025 at 152, 153-56.) 
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On November 5, and December 17,2001, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing in the matter. (R. 410; 292.) The court then ordered restitution in the following 
amounts: The court ordered Diviney to pay $554 to the office of Crime Victims' 
Reparations for medical expenses that were not covered by Deborah's health insurer; 
$2,121.37 to Crime Victims' Reparations for lost wages reimbursed to Deborah; $8 to 
Crime Victims' Reparations for travel expenses reimbursed to Deborah; $916 to Crime 
Victims' Reparations for personal property relating to installation of an alarm system and 
fees for 2 homes; and $499.05 to Crime Victims' Reparations for lost wages reimbursed 
to Chuck Diviney. (Case 2025 at 191-93.) A copy of the trial court's order of restitution 
is attached as Addendum C. Additional facts related to this appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court in this case erred in entering a "Judgment, Sentence" against 
Diviney for aggravated burglary, a second degree felony offense. According to the 
record, the state charged Diviney with burglary; Diviney pleaded guilty to that offense. 
Thereafter, the trial court entered a "Judgment, Sentence" against Diviney for aggravated 
burglary. The trial court committed clerical or plain error in entering the "Judgment, Sen-
tence." Diviney respectfully requests that this Court vacate the "Judgment, Sentence" for 
aggravated burglary and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment and sentence. 
Next, the trial court ordered Diviney to reimburse Crime Victims' Reparations for 
amounts in lost wages paid to Deborah Diviney and for amounts paid to Deborah for 
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personal property. In part, the restitution order was in error. First, Deborah was not 
entitled to recover amounts in lost wages that she never would have earned if she had not 
been injured as a result of the crimes in this case. Thus, Crime Victims' Reparations was 
not entitled to reimbursement for those amounts paid to Deborah. The restitution order is 
in error in that regard. 
Second, Deborah was not entitled to recover the cost of securing her Hazelhurst 
home. Deborah did not incur those costs as a result of the crimes in this matter. Thus, 
Crime Victims5 Reparations was not entitled to reimbursement for amounts paid to 
Deborah for securing that home. 
In this case, the record supports that the restitution order in part was in error. 
Diviney respectfully requests the entry of an order remanding the case for a reduction in 
restitution in the amount of $ 1,325.37. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF THE "JUDGMENT. 
SENTENCE" FOR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY WAS IN ERROR. 
A. THIS COURT MAY CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE / CLERICAL 
ERROR AT ANY TIME. 
Rule 22(e) provides the following: "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2003). The 
Utah Supreme Court has relied on Rule 22(e) to find that a court may correct a written 
sentence and judgment so that it is in harmony with the oral pronouncements of a trial 
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court at sentencing. 
In State v. Lorrahu 761 P.2d 1388, defendant pleaded guilty to rape of a child, 
which carried a minimum-mandatory prison term. At the sentencing hearing, the court 
orally pronounced sentence of the court that the defendant be incarcerated at the Utah 
State Prison for a minimum often years. Thereafter, a substitute clerk completed the 
preprinted judgment form "by checking a box providing for a sentence 'not to exceed 
years' and inserting the number 10 on the blank line." Id. at 1389. When the trial court's 
regular clerk later prepared an amended judgment reflecting the minimum-mandatory, 
oral sentence imposed at the hearing, the defendant objected and appealed. On review, 
the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment as proper. It cited to Rules 
22(e) and 30(b), and stated that "clerical errors and illegal sentences may be corrected at 
any time." KL at 1390; id at 1389-90. 
In this case, Diviney pleaded guilty in open court to a charge for burglary, a 
second degree felony offense. (Case 2025 at 106; R. 291:10.) In connection with 
sentencing, the trial court entered a "Judgment, Sentence" for "Aggravated] Burglary -
2nd degree felony offense." (Case 2025 at 127.) The written judgment is in error. 
As set forth below, Diviney respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 
correcting the illegal "Judgment, Sentence." Diviney may obtain relief from the illegal 
sentence and judgment for the first time on appeal pursuant to Rules 22(e) and 30(b). 
See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995) (Rule 22(e) permits an appellate 
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court to consider an illegal sentence even if the issue is raised first on appeal); Lorrah. 
761 P.2d at 1390; but see State v. Law. 2003 UT App 228, f4,477 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
B. AFTER DIVINEY ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA FOR BURGLARY. THE 
TRIAL COURT ENTERED AN ILLEGAL "JUDGMENT. SENTENCE" FOR 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY. 
1. Diviney Entered a Guilty Plea for Burglary. 
Pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may accept a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea for an offense from a defendant. Utah R. Crim. P. 
11(e) (2003). In order for such a plea to be valid, the court must ensure that the 
defendant "understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is 
entered." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). Also, the court must ensure there is a factual 
basis for the plea. See kL at 11(e)(4)(B); see also State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 375 
(Utah 1996) (defendant did not admit facts sufficient for aggravated murder conviction). 
In this case, pursuant to an agreement between the prosecutor, defense counsel, 
and Diviney, Diviney pleaded guilty to (count 1) burglary, a second degree felony 
offense (see R. 291:10); (count 2) aggravated assault, a third degree felony offense; and 
(counts 3-5) misdemeanor offenses. (R. 291:8-12.) In connection with the guilty pleas, 
the prosecutor filed a Second Amended Information. (Case 2025 at 113-115.) The 
Second Amended Information contained the charges to which Diviney pleaded guilty, 
including (count 1) burglary, a second degree felony offense. (Case 2025 at 113-115.) 
The trial court agreed to the filing of the Second Amended Information, and it 
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accepted Diviney's plea on each count, including the charge for burglary as follows: 
[THE COURT:] In the case ending 2025 in the Second Amended 
Information I'll grant the state's motion to amend Count I again, which was 
an aggravated burglary to a burglary, second degree felony, at 6662 South 
Royal Harvest Way, in Salt Lake County, on or about July 11th, in violation 
of the Utah Code, in that you, a party to the offense, entered or remained 
unlawfully in the dwelling of Charles Diviney the Third, with the intent to 
commit an assault. 
Do you understand that charge? 
DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: And again, same rights to go to trial, see the jury, have them be 
fair and impartial, have a unanimous verdict, confront and cross-examine 
witnesses. All of those constitutional rights you give up. 
Do you understand? 
DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: To the burglary, 2nd degree felony, in Count I, how do you plead? 
DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that. 
(R. 291:10; see also Case 2025 at 105-112 (Statement of Defendant, Certificate and 
Order).) 
Thereafter, the trial court executed a written "Judgment, Sentence" on the first 
count for aggravated burglary, a second degree felony. (See Case 2025 at 127, 128-31.) 
The trial court entered a judgment of conviction for the remaining counts in accordance 
with each corresponding plea. (See Case 2025 at 122, 124, 125, 126.) 
The trial court's entry of a "Judgment, Sentence" for aggravated burglary is 
11 
clerical or plain error. It should be corrected on appeal, as further explained. 
2. The "Judgment. Sentence "for Aggravated Burglary Is Erroneous. 
Under the plain-error doctrine, this Court will consider whether (i) an error exists, 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the court, and (iii) defendant was prejudiced. 
See e.g. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940-41. Here, an error exists where Diviney pleaded guilty 
to burglary (R. 291:10), and the trial court entered a "Judgment, Sentence" for 
"aggravated burglary." (Case 2025 at 127-131); see supra, Point I.B.I., herein. 
The error is obvious where the parties and the court intended the conviction for 
count 1 in this case to be for "burglary," a second degree felony offense. (See Case 2025 
at 113-15; R. 291:3-10); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202(2) (stating that burglary 
in a dwelling is a second degree felony offense); 76-6-203(2) (1999) (stating that an 
aggravated burglary is a first degree felony). Also, it is obvious since Diviney did not 
knowingly or voluntarily plead to a charge for aggravated burglary. See State v. 
Breckenridge. 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1984) (where record failed to support that 
defendant understood the nature of the plea and the elements of the offense, the plea 
must be set aside); see also State v. Mills. 898 P.2d 819, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); 
Thurman. 911 P.2d at 374-75. 
The record here supports the first and second prongs of the plain-error analysis. 
See Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that aggravated 
burglary is a first degree felony; an "aggravated burglary" for a lesser degree "is a legal 
12 
impossibility under Utah law"); Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389-90 (recognizing clerical error, 
where the original written judgment did not correspond to the sentence imposed in open 
court). This Court may correct the obvious error here, pursuant to Rules 22(e) and 30(b), 
and State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389-90. See supra. Point LA., herein. 
With respect to the third prong of the plain-error analysis, where the trial court 
here entered a written "Judgment, Sentence" against Diviney for "aggravated burglary," a 
"2d degree felony," that is prejudicial. To explain, in Parry, this Court ruled that "under 
Utah's statutory definition of aggravated burglary, [that offense] is a first degree felony." 
Parry. 837 P.2d at 999; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(2). There, the trial court's 
reference to the crime as a third degree felony was deemed to be "a legal impossibility" 
and ambiguous. Parry, 837 P.2d at 999. The trial court entered a corrected, written 
judgment for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony. Id. at 998. That correction was 
appropriate where the defendant in that case was "charged with 'aggravated burglary, a 
first degree felony,'" and convicted by a jury of "aggravated burglary." Id at 999. 
Here, Diviney was charged with "Burglary, a Second Degree Felony" (Case 2025 
at 113) and he pleaded guilty to burglary. (R. 291:10.) While the written "Judgment, 
Sentence" reflects a conviction for a second degree felony, it identifies the offense as 
"aggravated] burglary." (Case 2025 at 127.) 
The prejudice in this case exists due to the ambiguity caused by the written 
judgment. See Parry, 837 P.2d at 999 (recognizing the ambiguity when aggravated 
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burglary is identified as a lesser felony offense). Third parties relying on the written 
judgment in this case have referred to the second degree felony offense here as an 
"aggravated burglary." (See Case 2025 at 151,203, 227, 283.) If the ambiguity is not 
resolved, and if the judgment is not corrected to reflect a conviction for burglary, the 
ambiguity may be used against Diviney in any future filings or cases. 
Stated another way, in the event Diviney is convicted in the future of a criminal 
offense, AP&P will assess the "aggravating]" aspects of the offenses here to make 
sentencing and probation recommendations in the future case. See APPENDICES, 
APPENDIX D, UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, Definitions, 
Violence History, 1417; and Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances ~ Form 4, 1481 
(2003). If the history reflects a conviction for a first degree felony offense and/or 
aggravating circumstances, AP&P may include that information in a matrix for 
sentencing recommendations in the future matter. Thus, where the sentence here is for 
an "aggravated" burglary, that designation may prompt AP&P to recommend a harsher 
sentence against Diviney in connection with any future crime. See APPENDICES, 
APPENDIX D, UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, Definitions, 
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances — Form 4, 1481 (2003). 
Since Diviney did not plead here to a first degree charge for aggravated burglary, 
or to an aggravated second degree felony offense, it would be unfair and improper to 
reflect such a conviction on his record. The incorrect conviction may be used unfairly 
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against him in future proceedings. To ensure that does not happen, Diviney respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the judgment of conviction for "aggravated burglary-2d 
degree felony" and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a corrected 
"Judgment, Sentence" for burglary. See Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389-90. 
POINT II. THE RESTITUTION AWARD IN PART WAS IMPROPER AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
Restitution in this case is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2001). 
That provision states in part the following: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as 
provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-6(2) (1999); 
77-38a-201, et secu (Supp. 2001); 77-38a-301, et se^ (Supp. 2001). 
Section 76-3-201(l)(c) defines "pecuniary damages" as follows: 
"Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising 
out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities 
and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(1 )(c) (Supp. 2001); 77-38a-102(6) (Supp. 2001). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, the provisions governing restitution limit 
recovery to those amounts which are "necessary to compensate a victim for losses caused 
by the defendant." Monson v. Carter, 928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 1996): see also First 
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Sec. Bank. N.A. v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989) ("special 
damages" require proof that the injured party's loss has been realized or liquidated). 
Also, where the victim has made a claim for damages for "work loss," Utah 
statutory law defines that phrase to mean that the victim may be compensated for work 
s/he "would have performed" if s/he had not been injured; and the law requires that the 
victim mitigate his/her damages. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-25a-402(38) (defining 
"work loss" for victims' reparations); 63-25a-411 (4)(d) (Supp. 2003) (specifying that 
reparations may be made to a victim of crime for "actual loss of past earnings" and 
anticipated future earnings). Thus, a victim may receive reparations for actual amounts 
in lost wages, not theoretical or speculative amounts. The amount must be reduced "by 
any income from substitute work" the victim was capable of performing, but 
unreasonably failed to undertake. Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-402(38). 
In this case, the trial court ordered Diviney to reimburse Crime Victims' Repara-
tions for amounts in lost wages paid to Deborah. Diviney is challenging portions of the 
award here as legally improper, as further explained below. See infra, Point H.A., herein. 
Next, Utah statutory law authorizes the trial court to order restitution for damages 
arising from the defendant's criminal activities, or for conduct which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i). In this case, the 
trial court ordered reimbursement for costs that Deborah incurred in connection with in-
stalling an alarm system in her home. Those costs did not arise as a result of the criminal 
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activity here. See State v. Bicklev. 2002 UT App 342. If 12. 60 P.3d 582. Thus, they are 
not recoverable as restitution, as explained below. See infra. Point II.B., herein. 
A. DEBORAH DIVINEY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR 
WAGES SHE NEVER WOULD HAVE EARNED. THUS. CRIME VICTIMS' 
REPARATIONS WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION IN THE TOTAL 
AMOUNTS. 
According to Utah law, if a victim of crime accepts an award of reparations from 
the state (i.e., Crime Victims' Reparations), the victim's claims against the criminal 
defendant will be assigned automatically to Crime Victims' Reparations ("CVR"). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-419(l) (Supp. 2003). The amount that CVR pays to a victim 
is not binding on a court in "determining the order of restitution" imposed against a 
defendant. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-25a-403(2) (Supp. 2003). 
In this case, CVR paid Deborah in the amount of $2,362.41 for lost wages. 
(R. 410:6.) CVR reportedly compensated Deborah for days that she took off from work 
to attend court hearings and to care for an injury that she suffered to her hand in 
connection with the June 14, 2000 assault. (See R. 292:10-13.) 
Deborah explained the lost wages as follows. Prior to the June 14 assault in this 
case, Deborah worked as a senior account manager at Discover Card, and she worked for 
the Granite School District. (R. 292:39.) She received "paid time off' with Discover 
Card. (R. 292:36.) Deborah's claims for lost wages related only to time off from her job 
with the school district. (R. 292:48.) 
Deborah separated the amounts for lost wages from the school district into several 
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categories. She took the following days off work from the school district immediately 
after the June 14 assault: June 15 to June 21, 2000 (5 days). (R. 292:10.) She took days 
off work due to pain and swelling in her hand, including, June 30, 2000; July 31, 2000;3 
August 31, 2000; September 29, 2000; November 30, 2000; February 2, 20, and 28, 
2001; March 16, 26, and 30, 2001; April 30, 2001; and May 31, 2001. (R. 292:11-12.) 
Deborah took additional days off work from the school district for court, 
including, September 7, 2000; October 20, 25, and 27, 2000; December 12 and 13, 2000; 
January 29, and 30, 2001; March 2, 2001; and June 4, 2001. (R. 292:11-12.) And she 
took the following days off from the school district for hand surgery: December 4, and 5, 
2000; June 18-29, 2001 (10 days); and July 18, 2001. (R. 292:11-13; see supra note 3, 
herein.) The days off from work totaled 41. CVR paid Deborah approximately $48.25 
for each day that she did not work at the school district as set forth above. (R. 292:24.) 
In connection with the restitution hearing, the court ordered Diviney to reimburse 
CVR for lost wages paid to Deborah in the amount of $2,121.37. (Case 2025 at 191-93.) 
That amount is incorrect; 41 days at $48.25 equals $1,978.25. That amount should be 
corrected. In addition, the defense presented evidence to rebut Deborah's entitlement to 
compensation for the last day of each month that Deborah did not work at the school 
district. (See R. 292); see also State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98,1J20, 61 P.3d 1000 
3 Deborah admitted at the evidentiary hearing that she worked at a year-round school with 
Granite School District and was off from work during the month of July. (R. 292:55.) 
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(recognizing that a defendant can present evidence challenging restitution figures). 
Specifically, Deborah testified that prior to the assault in this matter, it was her 
routine and regular practice to take off the last working day of each month from the 
school district to work at Discover Card. (R. 292:61-62; also 292:48-49.) She referred 
to the last day of each month as a "charge-off day. On "charge-off days, Deborah had 
specific responsibilities at Discover Card. (See R. 292:58-59.) 
To explain, in her capacity as account manager for Discover Card, Deborah 
worked on specific accounts throughout each month. (R. 292:58.) On the last day of 
each month, or the charge-off day, she made calls on any outstanding accounts, and 
documented her collection efforts. (R. 292:59.) If Deborah was unable to collect on an 
account on the last day of the month, she would forward the account to the legal 
department. (R. 292:59.) 
Deborah testified that on "charge-off days, the work at Discover Card was 
constant, precise, and stressful. (R. 292:59.) 
Approximately six months prior to the assault in this case, the policies at Discover 
Card changed, allowing Deborah some flexibility on "charge-off days. (R. 292:63.) 
The policy changed as follows: under the old policy the company required account 
managers to process amounts collected on "charge-off days by 2:30 p.m. According to 
the new policy, account managers could process amounts to the account until 7:45 p.m. 
(R. 292:63-65.) Deborah testified that because of the flexibility in policy, if she chose to, 
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she could work both of her jobs on "charge-off5 days. (R. 292:65.) 
Yet, prior to the assaults in this case, even with the change in policy at Discover 
Card, Deborah never worked both jobs on the last day of each month. (R. 292:61-62.) 
And prior to the assaults in this case, she was never compensated from the school district 
for taking the last day of the month off from work. (R. 292:62.) 
Deborah also testified that after she recovered from the injuries inflicted on her 
during the assaults in this case, she continued with her routine and regular practice of 
taking the last day of each month off work from the school district in order to work on 
her accounts at Discover Card. (R. 292:67-68.) Since her recovery, she has never 
worked both jobs on "charge-off days; she continues to work only at Discover Card. 
(R. 292:67-68.) Thus, Deborah's history supports that prior to the injury and after 
recovery, she never actually earned wages at the school district on charge-off days. 
Nevertheless, Deborah admitted that for a year after the assaults in this case, she 
requested compensation from CVR for taking time off work from the school district on 
"charge off days. "Charge-off days included June 30, 2000 (R. 292:50; also 292:48-
49); July 31, 2000 (R. 292:50; see also 292:48-49, 55; note 3, supra): August 31, 2000 
(R. 292:50; also 292:48-49); September 29, 2000 (R. 292:51; also 292:48-49); 
October 27, 2000 (id); November 30, 2000 (R. 292:48-49); January 30, 2001 
(R. 292:51-52); February 28, 2001 (R. 292:52; also 292:48-49); March 30, 2001 
(R. 292:52; also 292:48-49); April 30, 2001 (id); May 31, 2001 (id); and June 29, 2001 
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(R. 292:52; also 292:48-49). Deborah received compensation from CVR for those dates 
and for July 18, 2001 (see supra, note 3, herein), although normally she would not have 
worked at the school district or received actual wages from the school district for those 
dates. (See R. 292:48-49, 51-52, 62.) 
In this case, the record supports that Deborah was not entitled to be compensated 
for "actual" work loss at the Granite School District on charge-off days. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-25a-41 l(4)(d). The history of Deborah's routine and common practice sup-
ports that she never would have worked at the school district on those days. While she 
claimed the injury kept her from working at the school district on the last day of each 
month, she continued to work at Discover Card. Indeed, in this case, on charge-off days, 
Deborah did not deviate from her "actual" and common work routine and practice. 
(R. 292:48-49, 50-52, 61-62); see Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-25a-402(38) (Supp. 2003), and 
76-3-201(l)(c) (Supp. 2001). 
Deborah's recovery for lost wages from the school district on charge-off days may 
be more properly classified as "general damages." See Washington v. American 
Community Stores Corp.. 244 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Neb. 1976) (recognizing that "loss of 
earning capacity" is a "general" damage claim, and loss of actual past earnings 
constitutes "special damages"); Delphen v. Department of Transp. & Dev.. 657 So. 2d 
328, 336 (La. App. 1995) (" [l]oss of earning capacity is not the same as lost wages. 
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Rather, earning capacity refers to a person's potential. Earning capacity is not necessarily 
determined by actual loss"), cert denied, 663 So.2d 717 (La. 1995). 
In determining restitution, Utah law requires the trial court to consider only spe-
cial damages, i.e. actual lost earnings, "not general damages". See. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-3-201(l)(c) (Supp. 2001); 63-25a-402(38) and -41 l(4)(d) (Supp. 2003). In this case, 
the trial court's order went beyond the statutorily prescribed "special damages." See New 
York State Depart, of Audit and Control v. Crime Compensation Board, 431 N.Y.S.2d 
598, 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (determining that crime victim had no actual loss of 
earnings where he was not employed at the time of the crime). 
In addition, Deborah admitted that working at Discover Card on charge-off days 
was stressful on her wrist, due to the added demands there. (R. 292:59.) Yet, curiously, 
on charge-off days, she worked that job rather then the job at the school district. (See 
R. 292:50-52.) Stated another way, given the injury to her wrist and the added demands 
of charge-off days, it would have been reasonable for Deborah to take time off work 
from Discover Card; she was at liberty to do that with pay and without jeopardizing her 
job there. (R. 292:36, 53.) If Deborah had wanted to, she then would have been able to 
work at the school district. Instead, she chose to work the more stressful job, and 
requested compensation for time off work from the school district even though it was 
never her practice to work at the school on charge-off days. 
In sum, the record shows that in accordance with Deborah's routine and historical 
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practice, she would not have worked at the school district on charge-off days if she had 
not been injured, and she would not have received wages from the school district on 
those days. Indeed, when Deborah was sufficiently recovered from her injury, she did 
not work at the school district on charge-off days. 
Since it was improper for Deborah to receive compensation from CVR for lost 
wages from the school district on charge-off days and days in July (see supra note 3), 
CVR is not entitled to restitution from Diviney for those reparations. In that regard, the 
trial court's restitution order exceeded the authority prescribed by law. The restitution 
award in this case should be reduced by the amount of $770.37: the value of 13 days 
($627.25 for "charge-off days and days worked in July), and the difference between the 
incorrect and the correct calculation ($143.12), as set forth supra page 18, herein. 
B. THE RESTITUTION ORDER FOR PERSONAL PROPERTY IS 
INSUPPORTABLE IN RELEVANT PART. 
Pursuant to Section 76-3-201, the trial court may order a defendant to pay 
restitution for personal-property damages incurred as a result of the criminal activity if 
the defendant is convicted of the criminal conduct, if the defendant admits responsibility 
for the conduct, or if the defendant agrees as part of a plea agreement to make restitution 
to the victim for the conduct. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) and (4)(a)(i). 
Before damages may be assessed for purposes of restitution, Utah law requires 
that the damages must arise "out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c). 
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In this case, C VR invited Deborah to request reparations from the state for costs 
incurred to secure her home after she obtained a protective order against Diviney, but 
before he engaged in the criminal activity alleged in this case. (See R. 292:32.) CVR 
then paid Deborah $1,044.37, and requested restitution (reimbursement) from Diviney in 
the amount of $916. (Case 2025 at 186.) The trial court ordered Diviney to pay that 
amount as part of restitution. (Case 2025 at 191-93.) The order in part was improper. 
To explain, according to the record, Deborah obtained a protective order against 
Diviney on May 5, 2000. (See R. 292:10.) On May 15, 2000, she secured her house at 
1767 West Hazelhurst by changing garage and door codes and changing locks. (Id.) On 
May 22, 2000, "she was back in court getting a permanent protective order." (R. 292:10.) 
On May 29, 2000, Deborah repaired a sliding glass door (R. 292:10), and on June 9, 
2000, Deborah purchased and paid for installation of an alarm service. (See 292:17.) 
She also signed a contract to have her home monitored for one year, with payments to be 
made in installments. (See R. 292:21-22.) Deborah took measures to secure her home at 
Hazelhurst prior to June 14. 
On July 5, 2000, the state charged Diviney with committing the following 
offenses on June 14, 2000, at 2075 East Harvest Park Court: witness tampering, assault 
(two counts) and violating a protective order. (Case 1430 at 2-4.) 
On June 28, 2000, Deborah installed a deadbolt at her home for $189. 
(R. 292:15.) On July 13, 2000, the state charged Diviney with committing additional 
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offenses on July 11, 2000, at 6662 South Royal Harvest Way. Those offenses included 
aggravated burglary, aggravated assault (3 counts), tampering with a witness and 
violating a protective order. (Case 2025 at 2-4, 19-22.) 
On July 12, 2000, Chuck had an alarm system installed at his home on South 
Royal Harvest Way. (R. 292:33-34.) The alarm was installed after the June 14 and 
July 11 incidents. Deborah testified that the alarm was donated to her son and installed 
for free. (R. 292:34.) She was required to pay only for a remote control, which was 
$237.00, and for monitoring services in the amount of $124. (See R. 292:34 and 21-24.) 
In December 2000, Diviney pleaded guilty to engaging in criminal conduct on 
June 14 and July 11, 2000. Diviney admitted that he committed an assault and he 
violated a protective order on June 14 at 2075 East Harvest Park Court, and he admitted 
he committed a burglary, an aggravated assault and an assault on July 11 at 6662 South 
Royal Harvest Way. (R.291.) 
Deborah admitted that she did not incur the costs for security to her home at 1767 
West Hazelhurst as a result of the crimes in this case. (See R. 292:32-33.) Nevertheless, 
CVR invited her to submit those costs to the state for reimbursement. (See R. 292:32.) 
Even if the state may extend such an invitation to Deborah, those amounts paid by the 
state are not related to the crimes in this case and are not recoverable against Diviney in 
this matter. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i). 
In this case, Diviney was not convicted for crimes that occurred at the Hazelhurst 
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address, he did not admit responsibility for crimes that occurred at that address, he did 
not agree to make restitution to Deborah or the state for costs incurred in connection with 
securing that address, and he is not responsible for costs associated with Deborah's 
property prior to June 14, 2000. (See record generally.) Thus, the order of restitution for 
costs relating to expenses incurred at that address is insupportable. 
In State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289, this Court ruled that for a 
defendant to admit responsibility for restitution, "the criminal conduct [must] be firmly 
established, much like a guilty plea." Id at }^5. It recognized that "a trial court must 
insure that formalities of an admission are met before restitution can be ordered." Id 
(cite omitted). In Watson, the state accused the defendant of driving the getaway car in a 
murder and selling the car after the crime. Id at ^|2. The defendant ultimately pleaded 
guilty to attempted obstruction of justice for selling the car. Id. Thereafter, the 
sentencing judge "made inferences about" the defendant's state of mind to conclude that 
she was involved in the murder, and the court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for 
that crime. See id. at^}5. 
This Court reversed the restitution order: "[I]t cannot be said that Watson admitted 
responsibility for the murder nor did she agree to pay restitution." Id; see also State v. 
Mast 2001 UT App 402,1J24,40 P.3d 1143. 
In State v. Bicklev, 2002 UT App 342, 60 P.3d 582, this Court ruled that the trial 
court could not order defendant to pay arrearages for criminal nonsupport predating the 
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earliest date charged in the information. Id. at 1fi[4, 12. In that case, the record failed to 
establish that the defendant agreed to be responsible for arrearages for earlier dates, and 
he did not admit responsibility for such arrearages or criminal nonsupport relating to 
those dates. Id. at f 12. 
In this case, the trial court miscalculated the amount in damages for personal 
property arising from the criminal conduct for which Diviney admitted responsibility and 
was convicted. According to Deborah and the representative for CVR, the only amounts 
attributable to the crimes that occurred in this case are as follows: $237 for a remote 
control and alarm system installed on July 12, 2000, and $124.00 for monitoring services 
at Royal Harvest Way. (R. 292:22-23, 34.) Yet, the trial court ordered Diviney to pay 
$916.00. (Case 2025 at 191-93.) That was error; the trial court's restitution order 
exceeded the authority prescribed by law. The restitution award for personal property 
should be reduced by $555.00 to $361.00. 
Diviney respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order of 
restitution and remand the case for a reduction in the restitution amounts. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Diviney respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse and remand the sentence in this case for a correction of clerical error, and for a 
reduction in the restitution amount of $ 1,325.37 ($770.37 plus $555). 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Chc\Ajjt^ j p f V i y\£Ay 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) TO 
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
s. 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
Count No. 
Honorable NcrCoi^L 
Clerk \"S*\*V 
Reporter 
Bailiff _ 
Date fl&ffifl £* «A~"»XM?\ 
D The motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by Da jury; • the cour t ^p lea of guilty; • plea 
of no contest; of the offense of /k U\~Mi:~n cd.—fatf*:iph\Ar C~l <<H 
a class _ n _ misdemeanor, being now present in colirt and ready for sentence and represented by 
fb.a<uz (1\\\,\*>A and the State being represented by X A ^ W x C V O , is 
now adjudged guilty of the above offense, 
^Q -^fs now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
^ o f _ a ' C£ months; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $_. 
j£± nd ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ t. f r f - ^ f -to VtefeflY\\NL 
rxwccxyrvr^r H^such sentence is to run concurrently with 
/ o such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of D StateJ? Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
\AsA 
are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and 
role for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation, - ^ 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and-
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
^Commitment shall issue 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ftcv^ 
DATED this day of . 
• 7 'A 
Defense Counsel 
~P.\W\Cvo 
Deputy County Attorney 
„ F u:"3D>AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
Page of 
Judgment/Sentence. UVA i l ^ i V ' / C R 
/ U ^ 
. /Honorable. M((,G dl 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION ^ t>t <f / 7iS>>~ 
^ U s u a l and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
D Serve ^ \ljc^i:> , i~r , ) ' ., M^ ' -V^ 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing . 
a Pay a fine in the amount of $ a at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; n at a rate of . 
^H?ay restitution in the amount of $ ; or&jn an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; n at a rate of ' ; or • at a rate to be determined by 
, the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Tp* Enter, participate in, and complete any_ program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Enter, participate in, and complete the program at . 
• Participate in and complete any • educational; and/or • vocational training • as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with . 
D Participate in and complete any training a as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or • with . 
• Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs, 
-gl Submit to drug testing. 
qkNot associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distributes narcotics or drugs. 
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally, 
n Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
^L Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
•ffis Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
lb Take antabuse • as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
f Obtain and maintain full-time employment. Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
76 Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with \ chrvicO . 
• Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
n, Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
& Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on. 
il£l 
.for a review of this sentence. 
iKiiiiLii w;..>) <\o*-c<UL& of 
• 
• 
"*u 
DATED this_d*feday o f _ s ^ a £ 
Page_ of 
'T. MP u?«=D AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
\*i 
Yu*m 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
Case Nn CO I c\l IQJir 
Count No. 3 
Me 
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• The motion of. . to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the courts! plea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of A a <a r*A& SAJxi f- , a felony 
of the degree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by v^jAfjL (Kw^^aoA the State being represented by £ V<AC\v>is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• 
• 
to a maximum mandatory term of 
not to exceed five years; 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
not to exceed years; 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be life; 
• 
• 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, Q Court(s) 
• 
Cfz> 
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to-. ftf**? \c.d4M<iti\M 
such sentence is to run concurrently with . 
. are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of above (t^Lprison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or £Mor delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant sfeflbe 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue ^ ^ (S^/lf \ 
DATED this M day of 
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D upon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) 
are hereby dismissed. 
i^"~ 
"QJDefendant is granted cfstay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be c&riffri§fl>^d 
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment, 
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• The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, Sf plea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of ^ ^ QiAsi c\£r.{ v ^ , , a felony 
of the ^5iWdegree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by omu fih^^^-rand the State being represented byt> \^0 \C\XN , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
• ^ not to exceed five years; 
«^£ of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; Q T ^ i I 5 
• of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
• not to exceed years; 
• y and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; *C\ D \ A \ s y 
SL and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ ft\1^VV *U { ^ C I V A U \ \ N ^ 
J&C such sentence is to run concurrently with CX*- * - C l ) Q C\\<r-^> ft 
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court(s) are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of above HHxprison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of ^ ^ 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyttdfiQpr delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, o^ HL^ for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defend^fsfe|y^e 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. ' v'V.vS. 
Commitment shall issue <Lj ) PrO^C \ ' • ^ 
DATED this J&L day of < )j^0^\ , tf^£\ Sfm '•*$ V«; j 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: **^MU*JL C^/tJj!J^ / '*'' 
J ^ - J « • - r s/i \< 
i W t * DISTRICT CC ft OV 
Defense Counsel 
- r ^ \ ^ - . . p t r - o V M r ^ r r - O M OF JtK3CJ= 
Deoutv Countv Attornev Pane of 
C 7 5 
vs 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
^aXi 
Address 
y*3 y *>/ 
DOB 
Plaintiff 
C}\CAfJjbO • \j\\Jifx&sA 
Defendant 
COMMITMENT 
After Judgment 
Case No. nni^ •d-0<£ \-
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
On the. day of hv^ ! ,49 d~-"5t> ,the above 
named defendant was brought before a judge of the District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
charged with having committed the crime of A ^ V ^ / v f . . < - / l ^ &Anyftl4 <XAQ&Ai) 
OA^AMlt ^ <^,,,,^U ^A..aaAAJa- , l/:%/..id)w C / d^hciflM. w? QLX^\ 
M<y 
The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of $ and to serve 
"*}HO— days in the County Jail with days in jail to be suspended upon payment of 
the fine on or before 
The fine has not been paid, nor secured, nor has an appeal been taken; 
You are hereby commanded to take said defendant into custody and safely keep until he/she shall serve 
out the above-named term of imprisonment or shall pay $ " not to exceed one day 
for each ^~»^~" of the fine. 
Dated tA vhflu-g * •-*> o 
~0*£* map} &* -'"<-£«^ac qf 
tffftriet Judge 
SAMP USED A^^- f^ ipy^OF^QE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CHARLES L DIVINEY, 
Defendant 
Custody: Prison 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001912025 FS 
Judge: SHEILA K. MCCLEVE 
Date: April 30, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lauraj 
Prosecutor: NOLAN, DANE C 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 23, 1951 
Video 
Tape Number: 4/30/2001 DV Tape Count: 9:33:46 
CHARGES 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/11/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/11/2000 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/11/2000 
SIMPLE ASSAULT - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/11/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/11/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
{Guilty Plea} 
{Guilty Plea} 
Paqe 1 
Case No: 001912025 
Date: Apr 30, 2001 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
C/O PRISON AND JAIL TERMS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH EACH OTHER, 
SUSPENDED ALL BUT MINIMUM 2 YEARS JAIL, CTS 280 DAYS. DEFT TO 
RECEIVE APPROPRIATE TREATMENT AT THE JAIL AND MAY BE RELEASED EARLY 
TO A TREATMENT AGENCY. COMMITMENT SENT WITH JAIL. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 24 month(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SIMPLE ASSAULT a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 6 month(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 6 month(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SIMPLE ASSAULT a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE 
ORDER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 365 
day(s). 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 280 day(s) previously served. 
Paqe 2 
Case No: 001912025 
Date: Apr 30, 2 001 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 720 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
3 6 MONTHS AP&P PROBATION UPON RELEASED FROM JAIL 
PAY RESTITUTION AS DETERMINED BY AP&P. DEFT HAS 90 DAYS TO REQUEST 
HEARING IF DISPUTE AMOUNT. 
OBTAIN AND MAINTAIN FULL TIME VERIFIABLE EMPLOYMENT AS SOON AS 
PERMITTED BY DEFT'S THERAPIST 
NO CONTACT WITH VICTIMS: CHARLES DIVINEY III, GARY MCCLELLAN & 
DEBORAH 
DIVINEY 
4 02 REDUCTION OF CHARGES UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF PROBATION 
WITH STATE'S STIPULATION. _ 
counseling, or 
Probation and 
Dated this ?*} day of *V'it 20 jmz&\ 
SHEILA K. MC 
D i s t r i c t 
By 
STAMP 
Paae 3 ( l a s t ) 
ADDENDUM B 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as par t of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4Xc) and <4)(d>. 
(iii; If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection f8Xb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a par t of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(hi) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (81 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts tha t have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(iij the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted*mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404. statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pat tern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pat tern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and t reatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(hi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or 
fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against 
any person who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as 
under Section 76-1-601. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
C. DANE NOLAN 4891 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
CASE NO. 001912025 
JUDGE SHEILA K. McCLEVE 
ah The above captioned matter having come before the Court on the 4 day of 
February, 2002, relating to the issue of restitution, the State of Utah being represented by 
its counsel, C. Dane Nolan, Salt Lake County Deputy District Attorney, the defendant 
having been present and represented by his counsel, Bruce Oliver, the Court having 
previously taken testimony, the Court having entertained oral argument, and the Court 
now being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
1. That the defendant is to pay, as restitution, the following amounts; 
-$554.00 to the office of Crime Victim's Reparations for medical expenses 
such as co-payments and prescriptions that were not covered by Debra 
Diviney's health insurer, 
—$2121.37 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra 
Diviney for lost wages, 
-$8.00 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney 
for travel expenses, 
—$916 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney for 
the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of quarterly fees 
associated with two alarm systems, and 
-499.05 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Chuck Diviney 
III for lost wages. 
2. The defendant is ordered to pay interest on the above amounts from the date of 
sentencing, April 30, 2001. 
Dated this <^6 day of / ^ = C > , 2002. „Af& 
SH 
Third District J 
I f i t 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing was delivered to Bruce Oliver, 180 
South 300 West #210, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, on t h g ^ ^ b day of February, 2002, 
through the United States Postal Service. 
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